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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 890418-CA

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and
JAMES R. WILLIAMS,

Priority No.

Defendants.

REPLY ARGUMENT

APPELLANTfS REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT I
Plaintiff

argues

that

the

initial

entry

of

judgment

was

proper: that at the time the stipulation was entered "the terms
were clear and

uncomplicated;" that a "signed"

stipulation was

submitted to the court; that defendant "did not request a hearing
on

this matter;"

and

"the

fact of defendant's default

contested." (Respondent's Brief page 2-3)

is not

The record demonstrates

the inaccuracy of every one of these propositions.
First and foremost, without belaboring the point, from the
stipulation that plaintiff had prepared to plaintiff's verified
motion for judgment, to the judgment itself, plaintiff insisted on
naming Robert Williams as the named defendant, as the named subject
of the stipulation, as the named subject of the motion for judgment

and as the person against whom judgment would be and was entered.
That was obvious error and defendant attempted (with futility) to
point

the

error

out.

There

verified motion seeking

is no

question

that

plaintiff's

judgment against Robert Williams should

have been denied.
Defendant did and continues to contest the "fact of default;"
defendant raised several arguments in its opposition to entry of
judgment (see Record pages 36-37) including the fact that defendant
had

tendered

according

to

a sum

that would

plaintiff's

have made

version

stipulation, notwithstanding

or

all payments

current

understanding

of

the

defendant's position that the oral

stipulation contemplated that a written stipulation setting forth
the dates and amounts of payments would be prepared before said
payments would become due; defendant's understanding of what was
contemplated by the oral stipulation is supported by the fact that
there

was

n^

reference

as

to

specific

amounts

or

the

dates

installment payments were due in the discussions before the court
indicating

that

an

agreement

had

been

reached

(no

specific

stipulation, per se f was read into the record, see transcript of
proceedings September 16, 1988).
Additionally,

the

terms

of the oral

stipulation

were

clear, though the agreement generally was uncomplicated.

not

It was

specifically contemplated that the agreement would be reduced to
writing and clear terms based on the general understanding.

When

the Court inquired as to who would prepare "the judgment" (page 7,
line

22-23

transcript

of

September
2

16, 1988 proceedings), Ms.

Denholm specifically responded that she would prepare the documents
(page 7, line 24, transcript of September 16, 1988 proceedings),
not a "judgment" and not a single document, but plural, more than
one document; that was because the parties and counsel understood
that in addition to an order or judgment there would a written
agreement or stipulation.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant never "requested" a hearing
on the motion for entry of judgment.
opportunity to request a hearing!

Defendant was never given an

No request or notice to submit

for decision was filed. Without notice to the parties, or at least
without notice to defendant or his counsel, on the second working
day after defendant timely filed his objection to entry of judgment
(actually, defendant had until five p. m. the day that the trial
court signed the judgment to file a response) , the trial court
summarily granted judgment.

The trial court as much as admits that

when it did so it was "asleep."

(See record at page 61)

If the

trial court was asleep when it came to defendant's most obvious and
simple objection, what consideration can defendant infer his other
arguments received? Defendant was not even accorded the relatively
abbreviated
Judicial

procedures

set forth

Administration.

Due

in Rule 4-501, Utah
process

as

guaranteed

Rules of
by

the

Constitutions of both Utah and the United States was denied the
defendant.
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II
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II
Plaintiff argues that its Rule 60(a) motion to amend the
judgment was properly granted.

That motion asserted

that the

judgment bore a "clerical" error and that the clerical error should
be corrected.

Allowing, for the sake of brevity of argument only,

that the identity of the party on a judgment could be a clerical
error (one having such devastating, substantive implications to the
aggrieved person, that it should not be considered as "clerical"),
it would be clerical only when an incorrect name different from the
name of the party appearing

on the pleadings leading

granting of judgment, was mistakenly typed in.
name appeared

to the

Robert Williams

throughout all of plaintiff's pleadings seeking

judgment, from stipulation to verified motion.

The name that

appeared on the judgment was the same as plaintiff had sought
judgment

against.

It

was

error,

succinctly pointed the error out.

certainly,

and

defendant

It was not clerical error,

however, and therefore the motion to amend should have been denied.
Plaintiff argues that "an error in the caption is not material
to the substance of the agreement."

That is hardly the question.

The only place the defendant is identified in plaintiff's pleadings
seeking judgment is in the caption of both the "stipulation" (not
signed by either defendant or counsel, see Record 40-41) and the
verified motion; only Robert Williams is there identified. Counsel
for defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff is in error, that
4

there is nothing more material or substantive than the identity of
a party against whom a pleading or more particularly a judgment is
directed.

There is no indicia whatsoever in plaintiff's pleadings

that they are directed to any one other than Robert Williams!

(No

"et al" in the caption, and so on.)
Plaintiff argues that the error and the amendment were not
"prejudicial" to James Williams.

It was plaintiff's sloth and

plaintiff's refusal to acknowledge the mistake in the written
version of the stipulation as to the identity of the responsible,
liable party that led to the disagreement and the withholding of
payment in the first place! It was plaintiff who declined tendered
payments from James Williams. Regarding which James Williams never
had the opportunity to address the trial court because, first, he
was not the subject of the motion before the court when judgment
was granted (Robert was) , and secondly because the defendant never
had the opportunity provided by Rule 4-501 Rules of Judicial
Administration to seek a hearing!

All of which has resulted in a

judgment for more than fifty thousand dollars against, first Robert
Williams and later against James Williams.

There was prejudice,

indeed!
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the trial court "clearly shows
that it read" defendant's objection. The record itself shows that
the trial court ignored defendant's objection, for despite the
objection's clear, absolutely accurate point that Robert Williams
was not the proper party, the trial court granted a motion against
Robert Williams and signed a judgment against Robert Williams.
5

While a great deal of deference is due the trial court, it would
be stretching

rational

standards of review beyond

any sensible

application to overlook the trial court's overlooking of an error
pointed out so specifically.

Reasonable persons can only infer

that the trial court did not read the defendant's objection,

III
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II
Appellant urges, inter alia, that the trial court also erred
at the April 1988 pretrial when it compelled defendant to elect
between the risk of contempt and jail or stipulate that he had
signed a personal guarantee.

Plaintiff argues that the threat of

jail made by the trial court was in the context of a citation for
"contempt"
exchange"

aimed

at

between

"misconduct,"

counsel

and

the

arising
trial

out

of

court.

a

"heated

Plaintiff's

characterization is entirely inaccurate and conclusively disputed
by the transcript of the pretrial proceedings.
Counsel

admits

that

the demeanor

impatient and perhaps "heated."

of

the

court

was

That was obvious from the first,

in the tone and manner of the trial court's
counsel's

trial

inquiry following

identification of James Williams: the court brusquely

asked "What does he have to do with it?" (pretrial transcript page
2 line 10) It was not so much the question itself, which implied
that the court was not familiar with the status or parties in the
case (although at that date the court's file consisted of twenty
pages only) f but its tone that caused counsel for defendant to be
6

stunned (being surprised at the court's apparent ire) and at a loss
of words to the point that it was counsel for plaintiff that
responded to the inquiry directed to counsel for the defendant
(pretrial transcript page 2 line 11-12) .
This counsel

will confess that on that occasion he was

inarticulate, unpersuasive and even slow in responding to the trial
court's inquiries.

In defense, however, this counsel will also

urge that the trial court was impatient and seemed to have already
decided the case even though it was not familiar with its status
or the nature of the parties.

The trial court seemed to believe

that defense counsel had or should have completed discovery (see
the trial court's statement at the top of page 6 of the pretrial
transcript)f even though a brief review of the twenty pages of the
record would have informed the court that while the defense had
responded

to plaintiff's

discovery

requests, the defense had

elected to not pursue discovery. (There is nothing in the Rules of
Civil Procedure mandating
pursuing discovery.)
persuasively

that a party expend

legal costs in

Counsel did not anticipate having to argue

at pretrial

the merits

and

weight

of evidence,

particularly as the majority of defendant's defenses were related
to the denial of several factual allegations and the application
of law to the facts, actually to the lack of facts in that the
defense anticipated that plaintiff would be unable to meet its
burden of proof as to many of the allegations (particularly as to
whether there was a personal guarantee or that defendant had agreed
to be responsible for the debts of the third party corporation).
7

Counsel was
hostility;

immediately

thereafter

inhibited

counsel's

efforts

position were repeatedly cutoff
least

a

dozen

occasions

in

by the court's
to explain

apparent

defendant's

(counsel was interrupted

the

brief

pretrial;

see

on at

pretrial

transcript page 3 line 7, page 5 line 13, page 6 line 14, page 7
line 2, page 7 line 22, page 8 line 7, page 9 line 7, page 10 line
12, line 14, line 21, page 11 line 20, page 12 line 7 ) .
was hampered,

if not

stymied, by

the

trial

court's

Counsel

effort

at

pretrial to hear the evidence, judge its weight and make findings:
THE COURT:

Now, you have a guarantee.

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:
guarantee?

Yes, we do.

Was there ever a cancellation of the

MISS DENHOLM:

No.

THE COURT: You are claiming this is a cancellation,
then, of the guarantee.
MR. LINDSLEY: We are claiming, as a matter of fact,
there was a cash on delivery relationship that occurred
prior to 1983 between the corporate entity and the
plaintiff.
THE COURT: Doesn't make any difference, does it?
Does it make any difference to a guarantee if you leave
the guarantee in effect?
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, first of all, first defense is
that there's no guarantee from James Williams.
THE COURT: Okay. Let me see the guarantee. Okay.
Show it to counsel. Does it have his name on it?
MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:
his name on it?

I am not sure that does.

Well, you show it to me.
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Does it have

MISS DENHOLM:
Yes.
Well, we believe it does.
Signature is identical to other signatures.
THE COURT:
Okay.
signature on there?
MR. WILLIAMS:
that ever.

Simple matter.

Is that your

It could be.

I don't recall signing

THE COURT: Doesn't matter.
if that's your signature.

Look at it and tell me

MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:
signature.

Does it look to be somebody's else's

MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

It could be my signature.

Probably not.

Then that's not a defense, is it?

MR. LINDSLEY:
In the admissions we denied
that's a personal guarantee.
THE COURT:

that

That doesn't matter.

(Pre-trial Transcript Page 7-9)
The document referred to as the "guarantee" is found in the
record at page 3 and 14, and is also in the addendum of appellant's
brief.

Although

the

trial

court

repeatedly

referred

to

the

document as a "guarantee" it was not a guarantee and it had not
been relied on by plaintiff in extending credit. The following are
observations arising from a brief review of the subject document
and the trial court record up to the date of the pretrial:
1. Plaintiff

attached

a copy of the same document

to its

original complaint and alleged that it was an agreement executed
by Robert Williams. (And by inference, plaintiff was alleging that
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it

had

relied

on

Robert

Williams1

promise

to

personally

be

responsible for the debts of the corporation.) (Record page 1-3)
2. It was purportedly executed in April of 1979, five years
prior to the insolvency of the corporation and its dissolution,
more

than eight years prior

to plaintiff's

filing

a complaint

against James Williams, and more than nine years prior

to the

pretrial. (Record page 3, page 12-14)
3. The signature is illegible. (Record page 3 and page 14)
4. The name printed on the form is that of Robert Williams.
(Record page 3 and 14)
5. The address and
document

next to

telephone

identified

the signature were

as "home" on the

those of Robert Williams.

(Record page 3 and 14)
6. The form is blank in the space provided to identify the
party to whom credit is being advanced, the "debtor" whose debts
are being guaranteed. (Record page 3 and 14)
Counsel for defendant held the opinion that evidence at trial
would show not only that the plaintiff did not rely on a promise
of James Williams
perceive

or

in extending

believe

the

credit, but

illegible

plaintiff

signature

on

the

did

not

"credit

application" to be James Williams' until several years after the
last

extension

of

credit

to

the

corporation, until

after

the

corporation was insolvent and had been dissolved, until after its
lawsuit against Robert Williams was being dismissed.
The court repeatedly responded to statements or proffers of
counsel and/or James Williams with comments like: "That's not a
10

defensef is it?" (pretrial transcript page 9 line 5) "That doesn't
matter." (pretrial transcript page 9 line 8) "You cannot waste time
just because you want to waste time." (pretrial transcript page 11
line 9-10 and line 23, page 9 line 14,)

The trial court's cross-

examination of defendant (pretrial transcript page 8 line 20 to
page 9 line 5) conjoined with the above, conjoined with the court's
demeanor and the repeated interruptions of counsel, culminated by
the trial court admonishing counsel that jail was guaranteed if
counsel persisted in denying that there was a personal guarantee:
the totality of circumstances make it clear that the court was
assuring counsel and defendant that to raise the issue and lose on
it was going

to entail sanctions

far more severe than those

provided for in the rules of civil procedure, that the court would
find someone in contempt and impose jail. That was error.

That

denied defendant due process.
The trial court was not familiar with the status of the case
nor the nature of the parties, at the commencement of the pretrial,
and the trial court still was not familiar with the identity or
nature of the parties eight months later when it signed a judgment
against Robert Williams.

Counsel was not playing games and

counsel had no intention of "wasting" the court's time: counsel did
intend

to contest whether

there was a personal guarantee, to

contest if and when the alleged debt occurred and by whom, to
contest the delay in pursuing

a claim against James Williams

(pursuant to both statute of limitations and the doctrine of
laches).
11

The trial court's threatened invocation of incarceration for
contesting an issue
law) epitomized

(which constituted questions of fact and of

the trial court's demeanor in the pretrial: the

defendant was indeed intimidated and denied due process.
Counsel does not suggest any malice on the part of the trial
court.

Counsel does not suggest that the trial court intended to

deny defendant due process.
err.

To err is human and judges can and do

This counsel had appeared

frequently before the Honorable

Judge Cornaby before the referenced pretrial and has continued to
frequently appear before the same court. Professional disagreement
both as to fact and as to interpretation of law has and continues
to occur

in some cases.

Counsel

also admits

that

if, on the

occasion of the pretrial, he had been more articulate, more quickly
responsive, the problem may have been avoided.

But it did happen

and Mr. James Williams paid for it by a loss of due process.

CONCLUSION
The trial court below repeatedly denied James Williams an
opportunity to be heard, from the coercion to stipulate that he had
signed the credit application, to the failure to comply with Rule
4-501

Utah

Rules

of

Judicial

Administration

and

granting

plaintiff's verified motion without hearing or an opportunity for
defendant to request a hearing, to the trial court's sua sponte
amendment of plaintiff's verified motion and granting of an amended
judgment based upon that.
order

reflecting

The lack of a written stipulation or an

and adopting

the oral
12

stipulation was due to

plaintiff's negligence, in part, and in plaintiff's persistence in
placing

Robert Williams name as the responsible party.

James

Williams had tendered performance which plaintiff rejected
defendant's objection Record at 36).

(see

The totality of circumstances

reflect a denial of due process and reversible error.

The amended

judgment should be reversed and ordered set aside.

Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1990.

William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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